#### Interpretation- the aff should have to defend a parametricization of their method

#### **Violation- the aff only discusses issues with existing scholarship without proposing an alternative or defending an alternative system of knowledge- even if they do, they need to defend a particular context where that method should be applied**

#### **Vote neg-**

#### **1.) Aff conditionality- absent defense of a specific advocacy the aff can shift their interpretation of their argument in every speech to dodge method criticisms, counter-methods and impact turns to their understanding of scholarship- a moving target affirmative makes all of their truth claims falsifiable, which replicates the form of hegemonic knowledge production they criticize**

#### **2.) Neg ground- no robust defense of an abstract method- all the best responses are in the context of particularized discussion- even if the aff is correct about the way that democracy scholarship works, how should we change it, who should we give aid to, what does that mean for policy? Those are questions the negative can contest- lack of clear point of contestation makes it impossible to be negative and undermines in-depth clash- it also means their aff isn’t subjected to rigorous scrutiny to determine if**

#### The aff will always win that the principles of their advocacy are good in the abstract – we can only debate the merits of their framework if they defend the specific consequences of political implementation

Ignatieff 4—Prof of Human Rights @ Harvard

Michael, *Lesser Evils* p. 20-1

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases**.** What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

## K

**THEIR UTOPIAN PROMISE OF CHANCE IS NOTHING MORE THAN THEORY OF PLAY- THIS PRECLUDES REAL EMANCIPATORY CHANGE. ONLY A MARXIST APPROACH CAN PRODUCE REAL CHANGE.**

**MIX 1997** (Deborah Mix, Purdue Univ. “Book review: Ludic Feminism and After: Postmodernism, Desire, and Labor in Late Capitalism” MFS Modern Fiction Studies Volume 43, Number 2, Summer 1997 pp. 564-567)

**Ebert believes that the current moment is one "of crisis for revolutionary politics" and that this crisis originates within the discourses of ludic feminism** (and other ludic theoretical stances) **and postmodernism and their privileging of desire.** She defines **ludic feminism** as "a feminism that is founded upon poststructuralist assumptions about linguistic play, difference, and the priority of discourse and thus **substitutes a politics of representation for radical social transformation." As a result of these positions, feminism's revolutionary potentials have been significantly reduced "to matters of textuality, desire, or voluntarism." The limited scope of feminist thinking and writing** ("a more and more restricted, ahistorical, and localist genre of descriptive and immanent writing"; "written in a 'feminine' language"; ''avoid[ing] abstract concepts"; "rely[ing] on . . . forms of intimate self-writing**") has limited, if not altogether precluded, emancipatory change for all peoples, since "the very issue of emancipation has been occluded in ludic feminism: dismissed as itself a totalizing** (read totalitarian) metanarrative."

**Frustrated by utopian promises of change (Donna Haraway's cyborg futures, for instance), Ebert calls for historical materialist critique as a means to revive feminism's revolutionary potentials.** In contrast to utopian "dreams" of a changed future, **historical materialist critique "historically situates the possibility of what exists under patriarchal capitalist relations of difference . . . and points to what is suppressed by the empirically existing: not just what is, but what could be."** In short, then, **this mode of critique and analysis "is the means for producing transformative knowledges."**

One of Ebert's main problems with much current feminist thought is that its practitioners are removed from both the historical and the material. **Much contemporary ludic theory, Ebert argues, can be termed "theory as play," meaning that it "addresses itself exclusively to cultural politics, understanding cultural politics as the theater of significations,** resignification ([Judith] Butler), remetaphorization ([Drucilla] Cornell), and redescription ([Richard] Rorty)." **Such a theoretical positioning "substitutes the personal** (playful meditation) **for the political** (historical explanation), **and in so doing** . . . **legitimates,** among other things, **a pragmatic pluralism that tolerates exploitation** (as one possible free choice)."

According to Ebert, **transformative change must be predicated on an understanding of social totality ("No praxical knowledge can be a local knowledge"), and "[t]he only way to acquire such a knowledge of social totality is to theorize diverse social practices in relation to each other and through the laws that foreground their necessary relations." Such an overarching understanding is beyond the purview of ludic theories since they position such an understanding as totalizing and therefore as violent**. Furthermore**, ludic theories cannot create any material change** since, in their readings, "there is no secure knowledge of the real or notion of justice on which to act -- only the continual repetition of contingent acts of judging that invent their own idiom, their own criteria as they go along." Through detailed discussions of the work of ludic theorists (**including** Jean Baudrillard, Judith **Butler,** Drucilla Cornell, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Elizabeth Grosz, Donna **Haraway**, Jean-François Lyotard, and Gayle Rubin), **Ebert shows** the ways in which she sees **their theories** **as ultimately complicit** (in their effects, if not always in their intentions**) with current economic and social conditions, the very same conditions these theorists claim to be working to overthrow**. She also spends time tracing the threads of what she calls "retrofeminism" and "power feminism" (Camille Paglia, Katie Roiphe, Naomi Wolf) and shows the way in which these threads can be woven together with those of ludic theories to "shift the site of struggle from socioeconomic emancipation to the sensuous maximizing of bodily pleasures and the libidinal liberation of the individual . . . . displac[ing] the social collective with the bourgeois monad and eras[ing] the political through the violent reinscription of the body."

For Ebert, **the answer to all of these problems is "*red feminism*." Only Marxist thought**, she believes, **offers a "rigorous, coherent, and total account" of the social whole**. **Relations of production and exchange construct everything--from gender to desire. Through a Marxist lens, "[p]atriarchy is primarily a material practice of labor in which the labor power of women is made available to capital for a fraction of the expense of male labor"; "the other is connected to all others (including those at the center) by the relations of production"; "[d]ifferences in class societies are always exploitative." Once the nature of all these issues is fully understood through a Marxist praxis then the transformative social change that is, finally, at the heart of feminism will occur.**

#### THE AFFIRMATIVE IS A FUNDAMENTAL MISREADING OF POLITICS AND THE REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS. THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS THE ‘BIOPOLITICAL STATE’ THAT SEEKS TO MANAGE AND CONTROL POPULATIONS FOR THE SAKE OF POWER. THE STATE AND CAPITAL MOVE HAND IN GLOVE—ONE CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT THE OTHER. ONLY A TOTAL DISTANCE FROM THE MODERN STATE CAN ALLOW FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CAPITAL. OTHERWISE WHAT IS PUSHED OUT THE DOOR ONLY COMES BACK IN THROUGH THE WINDOW\*\*

Meszaros 95

[Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition]P. 65

The modern state as the comprehensive political command structure of capital — is both the necessary prerequisite for the transformation of capital’s at first fragmented units into a viable system, and the overall framework for the full articulation and maintenance of the latter as a global system. In this fundamental sense the state on account of its constitutive and permanently sustaining role must be understood as an integral part of capital’s material ground itself. Or it contributes in a substantive way not only to the formation and consolidation of all of the major reproductive structures of society but also to their continued functioning. However, the close interrelationship holds also when viewed from the other side. For the modern state itself is quite inconceivable without capital as its social metabolic foundation. This makes the material reproductive structures of the capital system the necessary condition not only for the original constitution but also for the continued survival (and appropriate historical transformations) of the modern state in all its dimensions. These reproductive structures extend their Impact over everything, from the strictly material/repressive instruments cid juridical institutions of the state all the way to the most mediated ideological and political theorizations of its raison d’être and claimed legitimacy. It is on account of this reciprocal determination that we must speak of a close match between the social metabolic ground of the capital system on the one hand, and the modern state as the totalizing political command structure of the established productive and reproductive order on the other. For socialists this is a most uncomfortable and challenging reciprocity. It puts into relief the sobering fact that any intervention in the political domain — even when it envisages the radical overthrow of the capitalist state — can have only a very limited impact in the realization of the socialist project. And the other way round, the corollary of the same sobering fact is that, precisely because socialists have to confront the power of capital’s self-sustaining reciprocity under its fundamental dimensions, it should be never forgotten or ignored - although the tragedy of seventy years (if Soviet experience is that it had been willfully ignored — that there can be no chance of overcoming the power of capital without remaining faithful to the Marxian concern with the ‘withering away’ of the state.

#### FURTHER MORE, THE ABSENCE OF STRUCTURAL HISTORICISM IS NO MERE OVERSIGHT, NOR IS IT ENOUGH TO SIMPLY MENTION ECONOMICS IN A FEW OF YOUR CARDS-- THE RELIANCE OF INDENTY-BASED POLITICS IS NOT AN ACCIDENTAL INSTANCE OF IGNORING CLASS. THE DEMAND ARISES OUT OF THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM—SUCH POLITICS PARTICULARIZES THE OPPRESSIONS OF CAPITALISM TO THE POINT THAT THE UNIVERSAL SYSTEM IS NATURALIZED. ATTAINING WHITE, MALE BOURGEOISSE PRIVILEGE BECOMES THE BENCH-MARK OF POLITICAL SUCCESS, RE-ENTRENCHING THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THE SYSTEM

BROWN 93

[Wendy, Professor and Genius, “Wounded Attachments”, Political Theory, Aug]

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bour- geois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.

#### NEXT, THE REDUCTION OF CLASS TO A NEUTRAL LEVEL AMONG A LONG LIST OF OTHER OPPRESSIONS SUCH AS RACE AND GENDER, DESTROYS THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF CLASS TO REACH ACROSS ALL LINES OF INDENTITY AND FORGE POLITICAL ACTION. CLASS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS QUALITATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT—OTHERWISE THE SYSTEM IS ABLE TO SATISFY DEMANDS ON GROUNDS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, DESTROYING ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME CAPITALIST OPPRESSION\*\*\*

gimenez 2001

[Martha, Prof. Of Sociology at CU Boulder, “Marxism and Class, Gender and Race”, Race Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential. Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.

#### FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF STRUCTURAL KRITIK, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH THING AS ‘MAKING THINGS BETTER’— THEIR MODEL OF POLITICS, NO MATTER HOW SUBVERSIVE OR CONSERVATIVE, ALL FUNDAMENTALLY EXAGERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORMAL INSTITUTION OF POLITICS AND POWER, IGNORING THE WAYS SUCH A SYSTEM CREATES KNOWLEDGE—ONLY A MARXIST SHIFT TO KRITIK THE STRUCTURE AND CREATE MASS SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS WILL OVERCOME THIS FAILURE OF POLITICS

HARNECKER 2000

[Marta, Dir of MEPLA, Links, p. online: <http://www.dsp.org.au/links/back/issue16/harnecker.html> ]

To think about the construction of forces and the correlation of forces is to change the traditional vision of politics. This vision tends to reduce politics to the struggle over judicial and political institutions and to exaggerate the role of the state. Immediately one thinks of political parties and the fight over the control and orientation of the formal instruments of power.17 The most radical sectors focus all their political action on the conquest of political power and the destruction of the state. The reformists focus on the administration of political power and the exercise of government as the fundamental and sole form of political practice. The popular sectors and their struggles are the ignored colossus. This is what Helio Gallardo calls the "politicism" of the Latin American left.18 2) Overcoming the narrow conception of power To think about constructing forces is also to overcome the narrow vision that reduces the concept of right-wing power to that of the repressive aspects of the state. The power of the enemy is not only repressive but also, as Carlos Ruiz says, constructive, moulding, disciplining. If the power of the dominant classes were only for the purpose of subjecting the left to censorship, exclusion, obstacles or repression, it would be more fragile. Its strength derives from the fact that, in addition to eliminating those things it doesn't want, it is capable of creating what it does want: building channels, producing knowledge, rationales and consciousness. It is the power to impose its own way of being seen and of looking at the world.19 To think about how to construct forces is also to overcome the old and deeply rooted mistake of trying to build political forces whether through arms or the ballot box without building social force.20 3) Politics as the art of building social force in opposition to the system The rise of a social force opposing the system is what the ruling classes fear most. That is the source of their narrow conception of politics as the struggle to win positions of power within the institutionalised judicial and political apparatus. For the left, on the other hand, politics must be the art of building social force in opposition to the system. The left must not, therefore, see the people or popular social force as something given that can be manipulated and only needs to be stirred up, but as something that has to be built.

#### NEXT, THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—IT IS THIS LOGIC THAT MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE

dyer-witherford 99

[Nick, Prof at U. of Western Ontario, Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism ]

For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### FINALLY, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN ETHICAL ACTION THAT STANDS OUTSIDE OF POLITICS—YOUR ETHICAL DEMAND TO COME PRIOR TO THE STRUCTURAL NEGATION OF CAPITAL IS THE LARGEST VIOLATION OF ETHICS

Meszaros 95

[Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition]p. 409-10

Politics and morality are so closely intertwined in the real world that it is hardly imaginable to confront and resolve the conflicts of any age without bringing into play the crucial dimensions of both. Thus, whenever it is difficult to face the problems and contradictions of politics in the prevailing social order, theories of morality are also bound to suffer the consequences. Naturally, this relationship tends to prevail also in the positive direction. As the entire history of philosophy testifies, the authors of all major ethical works are also the originators of the seminal theoretical works on politics; and vice versa, all serious conceptualizations of politics have their necessary corollaries on the plane of moral discourse. This goes for Aristotle as much as for Hobbes and Spinoza, and for Rousseau and Kant as much as for Hegel. Indeed, in the case of Hegel we find his ethics fully integrated into his Philosophy of Right, i.e. his theory of the state. This is why it is so astonishing to read in Lukácss ‘Tactics and Ethics’ that ‘Hegel’s system is devoid of ethics’: a view which he later mellows to saying that the Hegelian treatment of ethics suffers the consequences of his system and the conservative bias of his theory of the state. It would be much more correct to say that — despite the conservative bias of his political conception — Hegel is the author of the last great systematic treatment of ethics. Compared to that, the twentieth century in the field of ethics (as well as in that of political philosophy) is very problematical. No doubt this has a great deal to do ‘eith the ever narrowing margin of alternatives allowed by the necessary mode of functioning of the global capital system which produces the wisdom of ‘there is no alternative’. For, evidently, there can be no meaningful moral discourse on the premiss that ‘there is no alternative’. Ethics is concerned with the evaluation and implementation of alternative goals which individuals and social groups can actually set themselves in their confrontations with the problems of their age. And this is where the inescapability of politics makes its impact. For even the most intensely committed investigation of ethics cannot be a substitute for a radical critique of politics in its frustrating and alienating contemporary reality. The slogan of ‘there is no alternative did not originate in ethics; nor is it enough to reassert in ethical/ontolog!cal terms the need for alternatives, no matter how passionately this is felt and predicated. The pursuit of viable alternatives to the destructive reality of capital’s social order in all its forms without which the socialist project is utterly pointless —is a practical matter. The role of morality and ethics is crucial to the success of this enterprise. But there can be no hope of success without the joint re-articulation of socialist moral discourse and political strategy, taking fully on board the painful lessons of the recent past.

#### THIS IS NOT THE ALTERNATIVE, BUT IN TRUTH THE ONLY OPTION— METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN ACT ON IT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION ON KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE OF LABOR AND SURPLUS VALUE MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION TO A SOCIETY BEYOND OPPRESSION

tumino 2001

[Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### AND NEXT, RESISTANCE TO CAPITAL MUST BE A TOTAL NEGATION OF THE SYSTEM FROM OUT-SIDE OF GOVERNMENT—WHILE SOME INSIDE POLITICAL GAINS ARE POSSIBLE, THEY ARE TRUMPED BY THE ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO USE REFORMS TO RESTABILIZE CAPITAL AND MARGINALIZE LABOR AS A SOCIAL ALTERNATIVE

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[Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition]p. 738

Thus the role of labour’s extra-parliamentary movement is twofold. On the one hand, it has to assert its strategic interests as a social metabolic alternative by confronting and forcefully negating in practical terms the structural determinations of the established order as manifest in the capital-relation and in the concomitant subordination of labour in the socioeconomic reproduction process, instead of helping to restabiize capital in crisis as it happened at important junctures of the reformist past. At the same time, on the other hand, the political power of capital which prevails in parliament needs to be and can be challenged through the pressure which extra-parliamentary forms of action can exercise on the legislative and executive, as witnessed by the impact of even the ‘single issue’ anti-poll-tax movement which played a major role in the fall of Margaret Thatcher from the top of the political pyramid. Without a strategically oriented and sustained extra-parliamentary challenge the parties alternating in government can continue to function as convenient reciprocal alibis for the structural failure of the system towards labour, thus effectively confining the role of the labour movement to its position as an inconvenient but marginalizable afterthought in capital’s parliamentary system. Thus in relation to both the material reproductive and the political domain, the constitution of a strategically viable socialist extra-parliamentaty mass movement — in conjunction with the traditional forms of labour’s, at present hopelessly derailed, political organization, which badly needs the radicalizing pressure and support of such extra-parliamentary forces — is a vital precondition for countering the massive extra-parliamentary power of capital.

## K

#### So-called “Queer” movements have been steeped in whiteness. Their failure to criticize and interrogate the use of the word “queer” and the community that is associated with it remains comfortably in the status quo racism.

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Julie M. Johnson: PhD director of the Writing and Oral communication programs at Hamline University. “On the development of

counter-racist quare public address studies’ in Queering Public Address ed. Charles Morris III. 2007 (129).

Quite simply, then, quare public address cannot focus exclusively on the inequalities produced and perpetuated along the binary axis of heterosexuality/homosexuality. Instead we must quare public address studies through explicit critical attention to the ways in which speaking subjects are simultaneously racialized, gendered, and positioned within socioeconomic class and other cultural/political hierarchies**.** Such a goal is imperative if the project it to enjoy relevance to the complicated quotidian. It is by now a commonplace in many cultural sectors that many people imagine the “gay community,” and indeed the “gay community” itself has been guilty of this, as highly educated, white, and male. The gay rights movement has been notorious for its enactment of racist exclusion—if not by “sidelining,” minimizing, or denying the dynamic role racism plays in the oppression of gay folks of color, then by replicating racist structures within its own institutions. The “leaders” of the post-Stonewall gay liberation movement, for instance, have mostly been white men. As Essex Hemphill writes in “Does Your Mama Know about Me?” the contemporary “gay rights” movement of the 1980s and 1990s **“**was not seriously concerned with the existence of black gay men except as sexual objects. In media and art the Black male was given little representation except as big, Black dick…. It has not fully dawned on white gay men that racist conditioning has rendered many of them no different from their heterosexual brothers in the eyes of Black gays and lesbians. Coming out of the closet to confront sexual oppression has not necessarily given white males the motivation or insight to transcend their racist conditioning.”

**The “queerbot” and the discourse of the 1ac ignores the presence of race and class hierarchies within the space created by imagining a nuclear future. They can never solve for the problems their aff presents as long as they remain blind to the racism they inscribe.**

**Johnson ‘07**

Julie M. **Johnson 2007**: PhD director of the Writing and Oral communication programs at Hamline University. “On the development of

counter-racist quare public address studies’ in Queering Public Address ed. Charles Morris III. 2007 (129-130).

The “gay community,” then, is not immune from the broader and deeper cultural trends that exclude African Americans and other people of color, for any co-cultural group will to some extent reflect the hierarchies of race, class, and gender politics at play in the majority culture**.** Tongues United is significant “precisely because of our lived experiences of discrimination in and exclusion from the white gay and lesbian community, and of discrimination in and exclusions from the black community.” The first critical principle, then**,** refuse to replicate this history of racism, misogyny, and class privilege. This will be no easy task, but Rigg’s documentary illuminates the path. Indeed the potrayals of identity in Tongues Untied are in his observation that “as gay men we’re othered by dominant straight society, as black men by white society.”

#### The label “Queerbot” assumes a white male center of analysis. Using the discourse of “queer” fails to create the rupture of US sexual exceptionalism. An aff ballot that affirms “queerness” just creates exclusions along new lines – even if they say we are a different form of “queering” the dominate connotation of the theory ensures that only white male subject will be allowed to appear in all their “queerness.” We should instead embrace the quarebot.

**Johnson ‘07**

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counter-racist quare public address studies’ in Queering Public Address ed. Charles Morris III. 2007 (121-122).

Those artifacts warranting inclusion in major anthologies of great speakers and speeches still reflect the privileges of education, wealth, masculinity, whiteness and heterosexuality. The voices that counter such privilege on multiple fronts—for instance, the voices of counter-racist quare activists—rarely catch our critical attention. In this chapter, I draw from E. Patrick Johnson’s recent formulation of”quare” studies to explore the theoretical, methodological, and textual considerations that appear paramount to the process of “quaring” public address. As Johnson explains, “quare” draws on various black vernacular practices to refer to nonheterosexual identifies and subjectivities. I will use “quare” instead of “queer” both to stand in solidarity with members of contemporary black gay culture who perceive “queer” as rife with whiteness and to further my interests in developing theory that is explicitly counter-racist. I also acknowledge fully that usage of the word “queer” poses numerous problems because of its history and current popular status(in various sectors and regions of the United States) as a homonegative epithet. Like other impersonal referents, “queer” sometimes connotes maleness, masculinity, and, most important for my purposes, whiteness. Disciplinary debates about canonicity are not my primary concern in this chapter, nor do I feel compelled to rehash the debates here. Rather I am concerned to theorize quare public address “from the bottom up,” using Marlon Rigg’s Tongues Untied as the exemplar text from which to do so. I will argue that quaring public address entails a fundamental disruptions of historical silences in rhetorical scholarship regarding human sexuality, race, gender and class. This disruption—this forcible separation—entails an elemental breaking apart of the reified conceptualization of the representative homosexual speaking subject as “white,” as well as a breaking apart of normalized imaginary representations of the racialized speaking subject as heterosexual. To quare public address, I will argue, is to render what I would call homonormative or qaurentric standpoints regarding human erotic desires, passions, and lived experiences intelligible and authoritative in various public spheres.